The expression “making the best out of circumstances,” is usually relative; but in the case of Saudi and Turkish pragmatism towards the Ukraine crisis, it is absolute. It is so much so that I cannot think of other countries, none, that both the United States and Russia perceive as indispensable strategic partners at this critical juncture, all the while being fully aware [emphasis added] that these partners are simultaneously “sleeping with their enemy”. Were Saudi and Turkey men, they have hit the jackpot in a seemingly impossible-to-work polygamy.
It is as though a man (Saudi Arabia or Turkey) marries two gorgeous women (the United States and Russia) who despise one another, yet deeply love that man, and can’t stand the idea of losing him entirely, that they each acquiesce in the polygamy—notwithstanding the other wife being her sworn enemy—without biting his head off. Venenum in auro bibitur, they would drink the poison served in the golden cup. But, of course, this is an utopian analogy that can never manifest; for God never blessed a man with such fortune, nor will He ever do so; lest his mind-blown fellowmen, bearing witness to the manifestation of that inexplicable wonder—second to none but to the creation of life itself—proclaim that man a living god and worship him. Indeed, this is the fortune of gods not men. Lucifer, himself, would definitely recant his claim of being superior to man and spend eternity serving at the discretion of such a man.
Whether it is by chance, design, or a bit of both, Saudi and Turkey’s current position in the sphere of international politics, especially vis-á-vis the United States and Russia in the shadows of the war in Ukraine, is nothing short of utopia; and they intend to make the most of it.
For the truth of the matter is this:
Over the course of almost four months now, Turkey has maintained its immunity to the fast-spreading Russia-demonization fever; and that, in turn, has tremendously improved its international utility and advanced its presence on the international stage. Being Russia’s prominent interlocutor, of the 30 NATO countries, in regard to the ongoing Ukraine crisis has its own perks—not to mention Turkey’s periodic collaboration with Russian on Middle-Eastern affairs.
“Who cares if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice,” once said Deng Xiaoping (Spar and Oi).
For Turkey, however, the mice (i.e. considerations) it covets cannot be all fetched (i.e. granted) by either one cat (the United States and/or Russia) by itself; therefore, Turkey needs to keep both cats in the house.
Toward that end, the Turkish leadership understands that there is more Chinese philosophy that needs to be applied—namely, vis-á-vis the term crisis. “In crisis there are always opportunity,” goes one Chinese proverb (Fitzgerald and Packwood, 2013). What is far more captivating still, is the Chinese understanding of the word ‘crisis’. Contrary to its general use, the term in Chinese is a dialectical fusion of danger and opportunity, which offers an apt pragmatic approach to navigate through turbulent times [emphasis added].
Verily, the war in Ukraine presents grave peril to the entire world; but within the folds of such peril lie great many opportunities for some. In the special case of Turkey, given its geopolitical position, these opportunities span a broad spectrum of strategic interests and would dramatically amplify its regional as well as international leverage to pursue them. And I don’t employ ‘leverage’ here in the conventional sense of the term—as in means to pull strings (which is the case with Saudi Arabia, nonetheless); rather, as in influence gained by having more to bring to the table. What I find particularly remarkable about this circumstantially acquired leverage (the additional platters Turkey has to serve to the international relations table) is that in accepting any of the considerations that Turkey offers, the other parties (the West and Russia) are actually advancing Turkish interests.
Thanks to Turkey’s open dialogue with Russia, its Western partners—the United States in particular—won’t have to compromise their ‘political correctness’ and publicly deal with their Russian counterparts as frequent as the current situation requires, at least in the meantime. This role has subtly established a de facto Russian-Turkish partnership on matters pertaining to Russia’s vital strategic-security, especially vis-á-vis NATO; all the while Turkey continues to be under the aegis of the NATO Alliance; thereby securing itself on all fronts.
Credit: REUTERS)
Furthermore, in blocking efforts to “fast-track Finland and Sweden’s NATO applications” last month, Turkey was foremost reaffirming its stance with respect to foreign countries vocalizing their open support to the Kurdish cause, a national security issue of high sensitivity to the former, whilst simultaneously giving Russia a political relief. Consequently, by the virtue of this incidentally recurrent alignment of strategic interests, Russia started to see in Turkey the partner behind the enemy’s wall [emphasis added].
On Wednesday, June 8, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a joint news conference with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu in Ankara, in which he told reporters:
“We are ready to ensure the safety of ships that leave Ukrainian ports,” and he named Russia’s partner of choice in this endeavor, “we are ready to do this in cooperation with our Turkish colleagues.”
Notably, this joint conference took place few days after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced his country was to undertake a military operation against the SDF in northern Syria.
Putting the pieces together, this is probably the best possible quid pro quo arrangement that any country could hope to have in its interrelations with another. It is stark obvious that Turkey stands to score huge wins on multiple accounts in every transaction it makes with Russia at an infinitesimal cost [emphasis added].
Likewise, the Ukraine crisis, alongside spiraling global inflation, has created favorable conditions in the international sphere for Saudi Arabia to reassert itself as a recognizable power with interests of its own—more importantly still, one that has the ability to change the course of events. After two years of putting up with a condescending U.S. administration, the time was ripe for Saudi’s disgruntled leader to settle few scores.
Since he took office, driven by impracticable political correctness and idealism, President Biden has done an admirable job antagonizing the Kingdom’s ambitious and proud Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, over the assassination of Washington Post journalist, Khashoggi. Unsurprisingly, the intricacies of the Ukrainian scene and the balance-of-power dynamics involved; given oil centrality to the Russian economy; and, needless to mention the frustration of the American public with ever-surging oil prices; have all compelled the U.S. President to seek out the help of Saudi on this matter of significant domestic and foreign urgency for the United States—of which, by the way, the Crown Prince is well-aware.
As a matter of fact, he knew that this day would come. When President Biden vowed justice (i.e. accountability) for the assassination of Washington Post journalist, Khashoggi, and labelled the oil-rich country a “pariah,” “MBS [Mohammed bin Salman] told The Atlantic, “Simply, I do not care” if Biden misunderstands him, adding, “It’s up to him to think about the interests of America,”” (Reimann).
Moreover, Mohammed bin Salman had one more Eastern wild card up his sleeve, which he saved for the prestige. Rumors began to circulate around mid-March, that the Crown Prince was holding talks with the Chinese—those could possibly conclude with Saudi accepting yuan-denominated payments for its oil sales to the latter (the world biggest oil importer)—the result of which would be an inevitable demotion of U.S. dollar status, as the currency of choice for invoices, in the global petroleum market (Rosen).
Eventually, Joe flinched first.
Embedded in some of the headlines of the past few hours (at the time of writing) were the words, “President Biden to Visit Saudi Arabia…”
It’s alright Mr. President, MBS is fully cognizant of the overpowering strain of this nonsensical political correctness that has been enshrined in Western politics.
Naturally, Saudi’s newly adopted hardline towards the United States was favorably perceived by Russia. One may also add that Saudi did not miss the opportunity to further convey its disgruntlement to the White House by refraining from bandwagoning the U.S. led dual condemnation and isolation campaign against Russia in international venues. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Gulf states abstained from voting against Russia in international venues—assuming a neutral position over the war in Ukraine—following Saudi’s suit. As a result, Russia rewarded Saudi in devising its sway in the Middle-East region, namely in Syria and vis-á-vis Iran, in support of the latter’s strategic interests.
Overall, Saudi has conspicuously cherry-picked the opportunities of the most strategic value that the war in Ukraine has created in the international sphere, and didn’t let a single one slip from its grasp.
In a nutshell, it appears that the Ukraine crisis has borne more of the ‘opportunity’ component of the dialectic than the ‘danger’ one for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Whether it is by chance, design, or a bit of both, Saudi and Turkey’s current position in the sphere of international politics, especially vis-á-vis the United States and Russia in the shadows of the war in Ukraine, is nothing short of utopia; and they are surely making the most of it.
Related Publications: “Ukraine Crisis [Part VII: Re-alignments in the Middle-East],” and, “China’s Global Positioning: Taiwan, Orbital Bombardment System (OBS), and Climate Change.”
Reference
Spar, Debora and Jean Oi. China: Building “Capitalism with Socialist Characteristics”. Boston: Harvard Business School, October 16, 2006.
