Upon the dramatic failure of perestroika, the ruse of NATO ‘non-enlargement’ associated with the Two-Plus-Four German unification treaty, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991, the Soviet sphere of influence had contracted considerably. “In August 1991, disgruntled military and security officials had launched a coup against [Gorbachev],” (Stent 3). On the heels thereof, on 25 December of the same year, Gorbachev made a televised appearance in which he announced his resignation—and, thereby, the end of the USSR—leaving behind a bewildered Russian population to face an uncertain tomorrow, and at a loss as to their reborn country’s standing vis-á-vis the West and the world.
It was a completely new reality that Russians, utterly unprepared, were thrown into in an instant. For the first time since 1721, when the title of emperor was conferred upon Peter I (Peter the Great), Russia was neither an empire nor the de facto and uncontested center of power for a vast empire-like union of states that was internationally recognized as a super-power. The Russia that emerged then was a Federation. The manifold question that wearied the minds of many Russians, therefore, was: how would this classification or form of statehood impact Russia’s international status; was Russia still a great-power; and, if it was, would it be admitted into the ‘club of first-rate states’; yet, above all else, how ought they, as a people, relate to the peoples of Europe?
It should be readily apparent to the meanest intelligence that the last part, or inquiry, holds the answer to all preceding inquiries at a fundamental level. How else would a person, as a self, or a group, as a coherent unit, be able to define their relations to other entities prior to having fathomed and acquired an innately satisfying sense of identity? Incontrovertibly, having a clear notion of identity is required, perforce, to make such determinations.
For the truth of the matter is this:
“Russia is both a part of Europe and apart from Europe, and Russians have always been reluctant Europeans,” (Stent 35) Angela E. Stent so rightly observes.
However, Europe itself became part of a larger body, the West. And the ‘Western World,’ as an intellectual construct, though originally founded and applied on geographical basis in Greco-Roman civilizations in relation to the directions of sunrise and sunset as the earth revolves on its axis with respect to the sun, has been subject to change through time and according to context [emphasis added]. Perceived as an alliance bloc in the context of Cold War I (1947 – 1991), it became analogous to ‘the First World’; wherein the United States enjoyed preponderant influence; and by the same token, in terms of international politics and the juxtaposition of states on the international stage, the structure of the NATO Alliance was considered the representative reflection of its composition. This was a virtually universal perception—which the Soviets adhered to.
By the end of 1991, the pillars of the Soviet Eastern bloc—as opposed to the Western bloc—had collapsed; there was neither a Warsaw Pact nor a standing Soviet regime; ipso facto, the Eastern bloc, as an international political structure, was no more. Having that said, the ‘Eastern World,’ to which Soviet-Russians had belonged, had vanished entirely. Thereupon, the United States (i.e., the international system entire, in a unipolar world) recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the USSR. But this recognition didn’t per se confer upon the Russian Federation the same international status that the USSR had enjoyed—namely, in Europe. And post-Soviet Russians felt that, deeply.
Something that President Putin expressed so openly in his autobiography, “First Person,” “I only regretted that the Soviet Union had lost its position in Europe…. But I wanted something different to rise in its place [which I think was a shared sentiment by the post-Soviet Russian population]. And nothing different was proposed. That’s what hurt [my formatting].” (Stent 51)
For post-Soviet Russians, at the inception of their newborn Federation, the international realm was one wherein the Russian Federation was worldless (or, without a domain) and without a global telos to dedicate herself to (“And nothing different was proposed”). Not only that, Russians had to determine their post-Soviet/communist destination at a domestic level too. Such was an arduous undertaking to assume—given that every piece of structure [emphasis added] in their life had not been reduced to rubbles, but disappeared altogether. The Soviet regime had directed and controlled every aspect of public and private life in a godlike manner. It had a grand world agenda, again, in a fashion similar to the divine; notwithstanding, that then ostensibly omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient establishment had simply petered out. The perfect analogy for this occurrence, metaphorically speaking, would be the slaying of Zeus, the abolition of the gods, and the demolition of Olympus before all Greeks, all at once [emphasis added].
On the other side, not much had changed for countries that were already part of the ‘Western World,’ in the Cold War I context; not only their realm remained intact, it even got bigger. But, under the overall weight of these events, the context of purely political, rather than otherwise inherent, rivalry between two antagonist ideological blocs had evaporated, no less. Thus, the concept of the West gained a degree of elasticity—given that no rigidly binding context predefined its notional dimensions—by which means it evolved and expanded; acquiring additional civilizational connotations pertaining to culture and history.
Meanwhile, Russians were navigating the void of a non-extant world in search for a foothold in the international realm. As with all great nations, the Russian people had a rich culture and inspiring history to refer to. One thing was certain and had been substantiated in the immediate past, at that point; the USSR model doesn’t work. That is not to say that everything that once pertained thereto must be discarded, nevertheless. Throughout approximately three-quarters of a century as the USSR, Russia was a formidable power, and of a global presence, to be reckoned with—especially, in the post-WWII world—in which the Russians practically co-chaired the international system alongside the Americans. The USSR had one equal in terms of capability (of which, nuclear capability is implied per se) and global clout; and, the same could be said of the United States of America. In short, the world was bipolar, and Russia was one of its two poles of global power; an elevation of international status that Russians would wish to retain.
Such being the case, thenceforth, and ever since Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) manifested itself as a sui generic configuration particular to U.S.-Russian relations, Russians have constantly gauged their international status—namely, as a great/super-power—as per their country’s standing vis-á-vis the United States of America. So, the question “What did it mean that the United States and Russia no longer would face each other as antagonists whose large stockpiles of nuclear weapons targeted each other?” (Stent 2) would subsequently be rephrased to read, “Would it be possible for Russia to maintain its global respect and status, if it wasn’t the United States equal?” Inevitably, this line of questions would make Russia’s status heavily dependent on her ability to put herself in a continual tête-à-tête situations with the U.S. on the international stage, in pursuit of a sense of parity [emphasis added].
[For more on U.S.-Russian exceptionalism with respect to MAD, refer to my book on Apple Books, “U.S.-Russian Exceptionalism: Intelligence, MAD, and Détente”]
On the cultural and historical dimensions, Russians reverted to the pre-Soviet era for guidance; in which Russia was deeply engaged in European affairs; had shared numerous cycles of intellectual evolution, and ties of sweat and blood with other peoples of Europe; thus, viewed herself rightly as an integral part of an European whole. In other words, Russians had reckoned insofar culture and history are considered, that they would indubitably qualify, with reasonably minor adjustments, to join any pan-European structure. That structure would be the Collective West.
And, what is the Collective West? In fine, it is the ‘club of first-rate states’.
To be continued…
Related/recommended publications: “It Is Now Bound to a Single Act of Faith: Overcoming the 1999 Kosovo and the 2014 Ukraine Syndromes;” “A Game of Signals: Germany at the Fore, but Europe at the Center.”
Reference
Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
