Why the “Russians Are Abandoning Their Posts and Fleeing Battle” Fairy Tale Is, Simply, Too Good to Be True: Away From Strategy, Just Pure Logic

If you’ve accessed any social media platform over the past few days, you surely have come across “Breaking News” from mainstream media on the miraculous, mind-blowing, and galvanizing territorial advances made by Ukrainian forces, in your newsfeed; as they have (or so has been alleged) overwhelmed Russian forces with their blitz offensive; instilling insufferable horror in the invaders’ hearts; thereby forcing them to turn tail and run, out of sheer fear. True, the Ukrainian military made some territorial gains. It is also equally true that Russian forces fell back to deeper lines of defence. But the claim that the Russians were scared off by the might of Ukrainian firepower is ridiculous at par, and is incomprehensible to the historically conscious mind by any stretch of the imagination.  

 

Let us put emotions aside for a minute, sieve through this from the standpoint of pure logic, and employ established historical facts as our benchmark in the process. 

 

Remember the unipolar decade, the 1990s? Enervated due to the collapse of the USSR; which entailed huge losses in resources and manpower; whilst every dimension of Russia’s perception of its strength had drastically worsened; and the hope of a better tomorrow hang by a thread for the Russian public; it was, in fine, a time of irksome bezporiadok (disorder) for the newborn Russian Federation. Do you happen to remember the Bill and Boris bromance? And how docile the latter was throughout his tenure, until Kosovo? It is needless to say that Russia was then, relatively speaking, at its weakest. 

 

Notwithstanding, what happened in Kosovo? The bear was awakened from its hibernation!

 

Albeit that NATO, at the time, dominated the skies and had troops on the ground, “Russia and the United States almost came to direct physical blows in 1999 when Russian troops rushed to the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, before NATO troops had entered Kosovo—directly contravening the terms of the cease-fire— in an attempt to establish control over the area. …The Russian soldiers who “dashed” to Pristina apparently disobeyed not only their political leaders but also their military superiors [my formatting]” (Stent 44). 

 

The question is: What lesson ought to be learned from such an incident? 

Simply put, the Russian spirit is too proud to be cowed. Granted, strategic retreat may be undertaken, sparingly [emphasis added], every now and then; yet, utter cowardice is out of the equation entirely. The Russian soul is incapable of comprehending such a trait in the context of conflict. Admittedly, diplomacy and other facets of statecraft may not be Russians’ particular strength; but valor is something found in abundance in the Russian DNA. As Stalin once put it, “Russians are remarkable warriors but they do not know how to make peace.”

By the same token, consider the matter thus, though I don’t mean to flutter the dovecotes by saying the following: Is NATO—an inherently and purposively military alliance (and, kindly do spare me the “defensive” and “NOT anti-Russia” narrative)—with the credo “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” (Lord Ismay)—that absent-minded [emphasis added], not to seize the opportunity whilst ‘the greatest identifiable strategic threat to the security of its member-states’ is suffering humiliating defeat, weigh in (mobilize), and serve a strike of fate to Russia? If such circumstances truly manifest [emphasis added] and NATO doesn’t act to secure a sweeping victory, then it was never worth a dime spent on it. 

 

At this point, the discourse will inevitably take the ‘nuclear deterrent’ turn. And, there, right there, is the whole point. Russia has for decades attained strategic nuclear parity with the United States—and, a divine-like nuclear superiority to all other nations, combined—that their interrelations have been governed ever since by the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) configuration. Accordingly, every confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, insofar reason reigns over decision making circles in Washington and Moscow, will be contained as to not escalate into thermonuclear warfare. Even half-wits are aware of this fact.  

In the case where Russia’s defeat is both imminent and inexorable, what would take a nuclear strike off the table? The Americans were the first to deploy atomic bombs, in retaliation for Pearl Harbor. The view from Moscow is, should it come to pass that Russia’s homeland security is compromised (i.e. Crimea is classified as homeland for Russia—recall 1853 – 1856), we won’t be more evil than the Americans, were we to deploy our nuclear capability. And the West, in no wise, dismisses such line of reasoning on the part of Russia, and the resulting eventuality it can bring about.

 

Sapere Aude! “Dare to know,” or, “dare to use your own reason!”

 

The stalemate which has abided for the past few months was by design! How so? I’ll try to put it succinctly and with much empathy as possible.

Over the past few decades, both Russia and the United States (or, the West at large) made significant advancements in the applied technology to their warfare/military capabilities. However, these capabilities were never really appraised vis-á-vis one another in the field—and some of them were developed ‘behind closed doors’, i.e. haven’t been experimented in a public demonstration. Hence, we saw a carefully controlled and gradual intensification of on-the-ground combats, in hopes of seducing the other side to unveil their crown-jewels, metaphorically. It is an explorational field operation wherein Russia and the West are gauging the live efficacy of the rival’s capabilities. To put it in perspective, think of a gambler who keeps buying into the game, so long it doesn’t require him to go all in [emphasis added], until his opponent slips a cue-tell that would reveal his hand.

With respect to Ukraine mounting a sweeping victory, despite how poetic and ideal this may sound to many in the West, realistically speaking, however, this can’t and, certainly, won’t happen. Alas, Ukrainian forces are advancing joyfully thither their own demise—like lambs led to the slaughterhouse. All this so they would make a subject for an emotionally appealing headline that is intended to arouse public remorse and sympathy. 

 

In a nutshell, neither Russia, nor the United States, and definitely not Europe, can afford Russia to fail or lose in Ukraine. That is to say, the concern that the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard N. Haass has stressed, three days after the beginning of the Special Military Operation/Invasion, remains as valid today as then:

 

“With Russian nuclear forces placed on alert, war has reached a new, dangerous phase. Up to now we have focused on the risks of Putin prevailing; now we must also face the risks of Putin failing. Escalation-broad use of cyber, attack on NATO, even nuclear use-cannot be ruled out.”

 

 

As I stated in a previous article, Russia is simply ‘Too Big to Fail’. This is neither an opinion nor a sentiment; in a word, it’s a fact.

 

 

Reference 

Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.