How we count ‘poles’ in the international political system has a considerable impact on the efficacy of multilateralism. Traditionally, the recognition of acting units as poles have been primarily founded upon their ranking in the international hierarchy of power. When an uncontested hegemon is identified, the system is said to be unipolar—which was the case in the 1990s, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, the United States rose to the status of hegemony. While having two preponderant powers; where their interaction {collaborations, confrontations, and balancing} is of such magnitude and authority to decide the fate of the world; with major powers (i.e. great powers) coming to the fold of one or the other whether by active alliance or passive alignment; produces a bipolar system—e.g. the post World War II international system. A multipolar system, alternatively, is one with a small number of consequential states (“Given the inequality of nations, however, the number of consequential states is small. From the Treaty of Westphalia to the present, eight major states at most have sought to coexist peacefully or have contended for mastery.” (Kant 131))—i.e. that small number needs to exceed two.
Currently, the unipolar classification is out of the equation entirely, as the world does not have a clear uncontested [emphasis added] hegemonic nation or power. That being said, we ought only to check whether there are more than two poles in the international political system. And if multipolarity is to be confirmed, how many in number does the ‘multi’ prefix correspond to? Further, for the sake of clarity, would it be utterly linguistically incorrect to classify the system as tri-polar—albeit how strange it may sound—if the counting returns only three preponderant powers? On a second thought, I’m going to use the term tripolar notwithstanding its linguistic correctness, should the counting renders three poles.
Conventional political wisdom has taught us that polarity in the international system “is any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system,” (“Polarity (International Relations)”). But, what connotations does the term power therein entail? Furthermore, what are the conceptual foundations upon which its hierarchical structure rests? More importantly, how is it distributed amongst acting units in the international system?
The immediately apparent connotation to power entails the ability to act and influence the actions of others. Now, with respect to the conceptual foundations of international power, for such extrinsic abilities to manifest in a relatively superior manner within the system, some intrinsic characteristics, constituting an impetus for the former, are requisite, these are: “[Considerable] size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence,” (Waltz 131). These characteristics, inter alia, determine a country’s level of interdependence (low or high) and define its applicable and/or operable capabilities. The ‘inter alia’ adverb here refers particularly to the expanse of international (global presence) and extraterrestrial (the race for space) domains wherein states operate and assert their preponderance over or superiority vis-á-vis other states, in addition to the supra-international dimension pertaining to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) [see “Limitations to Multilateralism: II. Interdependence”].
Regarding its distribution, power is distributed according to each state’s aptitude of—not just—acquiring, but also developing the above-mentioned criteria with certain levels of excellence as to render their deployment with efficacy to attain their personal ends feasible.
Once all those determinations have been gauged, the ultimate ranking on the international power hierarchy is awarded by an act of recognition—whether de jure (more precisely, self-evident status), or by force (i.e. the most expressive of which is a military showdown).
For the truth of the matter is this:
Ever since the 1950s, the term ‘global’ within the context of interstates relations—namely, comparison and relative ranking—has lost its splendor i.e. became practically obsolete. The clout of the United States and then the USSR, transcended beyond terrestrial dimensions unto celestial infinitude. Their advances in space have been unparalleled for decades heretofore—further cementing their super-power status [emphasis added]—until recently China caught up in that race [see “Congratulations China! Officially a ‘Superpower’”].
Truth be told, it remains unclear to me whether China has not thus far made its advent into the MAD supra-international dimension for want of capability and competence; its potentially well-founded anticipation of her inevitable admission into the superpower club by other—less antagonizing—means (i.e. the development of preponderant space capabilities, commensurate to those of the United States and Russia); or for sharing my conviction “that the United States and Russia would never allow any other country to acquire commensurate nuclear capability with theirs—especially that they, themselves, have been reducing and limiting their deployable warheads thereof ever since 1994 via START (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). It is a prohibited sphere of power; where trespassing onto would trigger the Third World War. In a word, it’s the foremost ‘thou shalt not!’ in the International Relations bible.” (Nasif)
China’s becoming a superpower has for long been prophesied. Although prematurely, yet emphatically, its fruition was declared by President Nixon in the ‘70s. That was one of the instances where recognition by peers, in terms of ranking, came into play. To give a rather more vivid account of the magnitude of that particular conferring of status, an elevation to the apex of the international power hierarchy, I find myself irresistibly tempted to borrow Waltz’ metaphor: “This was the greatest act of creation since Adam and Eve, and a true illustration of the superpower status of the United States. A country becomes a superpower if we treat it like one. [my italics] We create other states in our image [my formatting],” (Waltz 130). In my own words, I would say that China’s attainment of the superpower rank has always been an universal foresight of the country’s naturally ordained placement in the system; it is the most incontrovertible predestination (an apodeictic certainty) of an international-political potentiality becoming an actuality of all time.
Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, and himself had most aptly perceived “global power as a “three legged stool””—or, through the spectacles of polarity, a tripolar world—“and proceeded to ally with the Chinese leg to isolate the Soviet leg,” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 44). As for Russia, albeit not in the use of words, but in practice, it has acknowledged China’s status and treats the latter within the scope of strategic partnership (i.e. balancing the Western-bloc, which is de facto led by their American counterpart) as a superpower [emphasis added].
Proponents of multipolarity—in the pre-WWII sense of the word; that is, of more than three relatively consequential states rivaling amongst themselves for dominance and manipulating inferior powers in the process (Waltz, 1979)—poetically assert that, “Obviously, nations in multipolar environments have long-term strategic goals, but by definition no power can hope to overwhelm its enemies (or the inevitable coalition that would rise against it if it became too powerful). This often means that even though there is more “action,” the scope and effect of conflicts have a lower ceiling,” (Jacob L. Shapiro). I personally tend to disagree with the last deduction proffered, in line with Kenneth N. Waltz’ (1979) counter-reasoning: that smaller number systems bring more stability. However, this is not the focal point of this article in order for me to elaborate further on it.
As for the notion that ‘no power can hope to overwhelm its enemies (or the inevitable coalition that would rise against it if it became too powerful)’, I have amply elucidated how that is inapplicable to the United States and Russia in two earlier articles contributing to this series (Limitations to Multilateralism): “Limitations to Multilateralism: II. Interdependence;” and, “Limitations to Multilateralism: III. Vastly Discrepant Capabilities”. Put simply, neither the United States nor Russia is vulnerable to equal reciprocity [emphasis added] should the other opt for isolating herself; more precisely, not to engage actively within the MAD dimension. Furthermore, no force could summon a coalition of this sort against either, unless called upon by the nonbelligerent one.
Since China has been confirmed as a superpower, thanks to its recent successes in space (i.e. the Chinese Zhurong rover’s successful landing on Mars); which inadvertently reaffirms its capability; it is now time to determine the Chinese level of interdependence. China’s economic apparatus is simultaneously its blessing and curse. Courtesy of its industrial might, the scale of interdependence is notably tilted in China’s favor. That is to say, the world is far more dependent on China than the latter is on other acting units in the international system. Unless a universal embargo is imposed on China; which is a far-fetched unrealistic collective démarche; for a great many number of states rely heavily on Chinese industrial production—as well as cheap human capital—for supplies; China maintains a relatively low level of interdependence.
Notwithstanding it being the world’s biggest polluter, for which China is no stranger to acerbic criticisms, political smearing, and EU-US sanctions, China remains “[…] an elemental global actor and indispensable nexus sustaining the experience we refer to as ‘globalization’ and/or ‘global integration’. Thus, it necessarily follows that a ‘universal stake’ in China has been cultivated over the past few decades,” (Nasif II.*)
* This second reference to the same author, myself, corresponds to “The Chinese Conundrum: Are We Soon to Be Faced with the ‘Asian Question’?”
With respect to secondary capabilities, the Herculean Belt Road Initiative (BRI) attests for the vast expanse of its global presence and clout. Not to mention its tête-à-tête rivalry with the United States and Russia in the Arctic as well as in Antarctica. [for more on this subject, refer to “From Space to COVID-19:the Two Superpowers +1[the Antarctic Age]”]
The bottom line is: polarity is directly correlated to status—namely, the superpower status.
Should anyone wish to challenge that claim or the unparalleled supremacy of the United States, Russia, and China in the international system—that they alone have what it takes to constitute a pole—let them consider the current Afghan landscape. It is plain to the meanest intelligence that the entire international community stands by idly [emphasis added], waiting on—nay! Even praying for—one of the superpowers to assume the responsibility to act, so that they can simply—more so, halfheartedly—flock behind its banner—so much so that most powers began to mutter that Taliban is a fait accompli sovereign authority in Afghanistan.
Moreover, if we are to survey the great and rising powers of the world, inquiring their self-perception as to their ranking in the system and role, how many thereof would identify themself as poles? The wager is that it is one of the extreme rarities, an anomaly, that any perceives themself as such. True, they all solemnly chant the quixotic hymns of multipolarity—but none of them would—for none could—attempt to constitute a ‘pole’ given all its aspects and peculiarities. If self-recognition is wanting, how should we expect existing poles (i.e. superpowers) to confer peerage upon them? Fruit for thought…
Back to the Afghan scene, for the sake of the argument let us admit that the world is multipolar. It must needs be sensus communis that a power constituting a pole should possess the competency to lead collaborative action to resolve the matter at hand. It is not in my intention to flutter the dovecotes, still, I beseech the reader just to recline and observe so called rising-powers “acting at once like hens and ostriches,” (Waltz 152). They would all plead either for American, Russian, or Chinese action! No other power(s); neither individually; nor within a coalition; if one is formed in the first place; would raise a finger in the face of Taliban. This is not to say that none has the capability; but merely to illustrate how they would, with natural propensity, shy away from the obligations associated with being a ‘pole’ in the international system, i.e. solving global problems.
In fine, the international system lies somewhere along the transitional phase from bipolarity to tripolarity. Multipolarity—that which is in excess of three poles—should the United States, Russia, and China opt for isolating themselves from any given incident or global matter—would only inhibit multilateral efficacy and forestall action, hence causing multilateralism to become practically dysfunctional.
Reference
Fitzgerald, Michael R., and Allen Packwood, Out of the Cold: the Cold War and its Legacy. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2013.
Jacob L. Shapiro. “The Arrival of Multipolarity and Its Impact on US-Russia Relations.” Valdai Club, valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-arrival-of-multipolarity-and-its-impact/?fbclid=IwAR0xjoaIpEire3Au1tYtujTiTVCUBJTS58N2_DOKdBAdGmG0HRFG0noD6q4.
Kenneth, Waltz N. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 2010.
Nasif, Alan. “Congratulations China! Officially a ‘Superpower’.” Intelligence Scoop – A Blog Addressing Politics, Sociology, and Philosophy, Economics, and Psychology, 5 July 2021, www.intel-scoop.com/congratulations-china-officially-a-superpower/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2021.
Nasif, Alan. “The Chinese Conundrum: Are We Soon to Be Faced with the ‘Asian Question’?” Intelligence Scoop – A Blog Addressing Politics, Sociology, and Philosophy, Economics, and Psychology, 5 July 2021, www.intel-scoop.com/the-chinese-conundrum-are-we-soon-to-be-faced-with-the-asian-question/. Accessed 18 Aug. 2021.
“Polarity (international Relations).” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Wikimedia Foundation, Inc, 19 Oct. 2005, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polarity_(international_relations). Accessed 17 Aug. 2021.
