The colossal underwater project, known as Nord Stream 2, is more than a gas pipeline. It is a symbolic solidification of the eternal and inalterable Russo-European connectedness. Cynics perceive the pipeline as a threat to European economic, energy, and political interests that fosters Russian influence and leverage over the continent; while optimists extol the potential for rapprochement and stability that this project might bring to EU-Russian relations. But the truth transcends above all perspectives, cynical and optimistic alike. For perspectives are naturally tainted with the colors of prejudice and personal interests.
I tend to be sanguine with respect to Russian intentions vis-á-vis Europe—given my conviction that they are inherently of integrative nature; contrary to the prevalent, namely in Ukraine and the United States, erroneous perception that they are maliciously expansive dominance-seeking cravings.
For the truth of the matter is this:
The demand for Russian gas has never been confined to European markets; which reasonably makes Russia less dependent on Europe in terms of energy security than the latter is on her. As President Putin noted years back at one Valdai meeting, “… Russia had other alternatives for its vast and desirable energy resources—namely, exporting them to Asia instead of Europe,” (Stent 192). Which is indisputably both true and feasible. But that does not imply per se that Russia would utilize the Nord Stream pipelines as means for political leverage and the destabilization of European energy security. Were this the case, onshore pipelines running through Ukraine would have served the same end. [emphasis added]
Western critics of the Nord Stream projects often resort to bogus precedent (i.e. the New Year’s morning 2006 incident)—notwithstanding that it might had been, and actually was, an unintended mishap—in advancing their arguments pertaining to energy security. In order to keep Ukraine within fold, Putin then reasoned:
“if Ukraine wanted to join the West and turn its back on Russia, there was no reason why Russia should continue to subsidize its energy. Ukraine was paying as little as $50 per 1,000 cubic meter for Russian gas, while Europe paid roughly three times more [my formatting]. As the December 31 [2005] deadline for renewing the gas contract approached, Ukraine refused to budge, leading to the January 1 [2006] cutoff. … When it publicly announced the gas cutoffon a cold New Year’s morning without informing its customers in Western Europe, this created the impression of political bullying, whereas there was also commercial justification for what it did [my italics]. … But the Kremlin miscalculated. Whereas Ukraine made sure that it had enough gas by siphoning off supplies destined for Europe—thereby imposing gas shortages on some European consumers—the Europeans blamed Russia, rather than Ukraine, for their shortages [my formatting].” (Stent 195)
One can safely thus infer that it was totally a mishap as well as a misunderstanding, as Ukraine was the party responsible for disrupting the gas flow to Europe in order to secure enough of it for itself by siphoning; hence, it wasn’t a Russian call to cutoff gas supplies to Europe.
Admittedly, I have underscored the following insight ad nausea in several publications; nevertheless, it is worth being recollected once more herein:
“A comprehensive understanding of European history is categorically imperative to fathom the guiding philosophy of Russian foreign policy. It’s all about Europe—as it always has been [emphasis added]. To put Hegelian philosophy to application, Russia could only attain self-consciousness through introspection within a European context.
“The determination of Russia’s European identity is not entrapped by questions of political and economic modeling, as many so hastily assume, but chiefly hangs upon the question of utility. This particular notion of usefulness, or role, within a European context constitutes one of the main pillars defining Russia’s place in history—that remains sacrosanct for many Russians today. Its telos is simple, order. A state of pan-European order, wherein cooperative and constructive partnerships are requisite amongst the vested great powers, with Russia as one of its lawful sentinels.” (Nasif 1) [see my LinkedIn article, “It Is Now Bound to a Single Act of Faith: Overcoming the 1999 Kosovo and the 2014 Ukraine Syndromes”].” (Nasif)
To put it in perspective, the Nord Stream projects are more than lucrative economic enterprises; means to gain an edge at the balance-of-power game with the United States; or, an instrument of economic warfare against Ukraine, for that matter—much less, holding Europe hostage under the threat of disrupting its energy supplies. Although two thirds of Russia lie in Asia; the remaining third is in Europe; and, that third carries Russia’s heart and identity. The Nord Streams represent the first direct [much emphasis added here!] Russo-European nexi, with absolutely no intermediaries, middle-parties, or middle-channels involved—none, whatsoever. The moral boost and cultural symbolism that accompany Nord Stream 2 outweigh by far both economic and political ends for Russia.
In fine, the Nord Streams are integrative projects: a tangible proof of the Russian self-perceived European identity, as well as a concrete reassurance of Russian everlasting connectedness to the European whole.
Reference
Nasif, Alan. “A Game of Signals: Germany at the Fore, but Europe at the Center.” Intelligence Scoop – A Blog Addressing Politics, Sociology, and Philosophy, Economics, and Psychology, 15 Aug. 2021, www.intel-scoop.com/a-game-of-signals-germany-at-the-fore-but-europe-at-the-center/. Accessed 23 Sept. 2021.
Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
