In commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War in Russia (which is the Russian national appellation for World War II), President Vladimir Putin had contributed an article on 22 June, 2021 to the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit titled, “Being Open, Despite the Past”.
He delineated therein the course for multifaceted strategic cooperation with Euro-Atlantic countries—namely, Germany—on both continental and international stages via capitalizing on the sense of camaraderie and unity of fate that manifested and brought Russia (then the USSR) and Europe, as well as the United States, together as a single defense force in the face of the most perilous horrors ever known to humanity, the tyranny of Nazism—which endangered the future liberty of mankind. Furthermore, President Putin has raised the prevailing concern about NATO’s ‘anti-Russian’ enlargement and eastward expansion, all the while Russia has been excluded from pan-European structures—which it has had every historical, cultural and geographical right to be part of—, and implicitly extolled the virtues of reason and pragmatism in dealing with threats and challenges in a dynamic world. To no one’s surprise, he has, as well, explicitly condemned “United States interventionism” in Ukraine, and charged the US of organizing the coup in the former, which has had destabilizing reverberations on the European security system as a whole. [see “Article by Vladimir Putin “Being Open, Despite the Past””]
The U.S. Department of State released a Fact Sheet, on the same day, “The United States and Germany: Strengthening Our Alliance,” that underlined the constructive, productive, and mutually beneficial nature of their bilateral relations at, inter alia, economic, environmental, political, and security levels. It has also touched on potential international challenges, under which it made reference to China and Russia—oddly, once. And, there was a scant mentioning of the two countries contributive efforts to promote and advance “security, democratic values, and the rule of law globally [my formatting]” (“United States and Germany: Strengthening Our Alliance”).
No doubt, the significance and magnitude of the occasion require the extension of symbolic gestures of trust, friendship, and partnership to Germany—being itself the first victim of Nazism, in spite of being the land of its origin. Moreover, Germany is the world’s fourth largest economy (Silver, 2020) and Europe’s first (Statista). Thus, it assumes a proportionate role and wields commensurate political influence in Europe’s decision-making halls and corridors.
So, the question is: What do we ought to make of all this?
The truth of the matter is this:
One thing the spectator of the realm of international relations must admire about the Russians, in general, and President Putin, in particular, is that they never resort to ambiguous language. It is a practical impossibility for any person with the faintest intelligence to be flummoxed while reading or listening to President Putin’s communications—especially when such communications address his desideratum. Should a person endeavor to read Putin’s (2000) autobiography, “First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President,” they couldn’t miss, even intentionally, the centrality of Europe vis-á-vis the Russian identity and his foreign policy.
Besides adherence to international norms, the United States and NATO have repeatedly demanded ‘predictability’ from President Putin. But, isn’t it overly perspicuous that the latter has in fact, and in the most cogent manner, time and again reiterated what his chief end is—ever since his ascension to power?
Put simply, President Putin’s most coveted desire has always been a pan-European (even a pan-Euro-Atlantic) structure, inclusive of both Russia and the United States—not a modus vivendi. From a Russian view point, NATO continues to be a Cold War relic as far as it persists at being exclusive of Russia—i.e. an ‘Anti-Russia Alliance’. The plus-one configuration would never suffice; nor would the ‘limited-in-scope’ NATO-Russian Council; notwithstanding NATO’s reassurances in its most recent communiqué that the Alliance is not anti-Russian per se, should Russia refrain from posing any threat to any of its member countries.
Consequently, President Putin came to the conclusion that NATO represents the last impediment standing between the attainment of Russia’s sought oneness with Europe. This has been a protracted issue hitherto, which he underscored in “The First Person,” that, “Russia is a country of European culture, not NATO culture,” (Stent 52).
A comprehensive understanding of European history is categorically imperative to fathom the guiding philosophy of Russian foreign policy. It’s all about Europe—as it always has been [emphasis added]. To put Hegelian philosophy to application, Russia could only attain self-consciousness through introspection within a European context.
“The determination of Russia’s European identity is not entrapped by questions of political and economic modeling, as many so hastily assume, but chiefly hangs upon the question of utility. This particular notion of usefulness, or role, within a European context constitutes one of the main pillars defining Russia’s place in history—that remains sacrosanct for many Russians today. Its telos is simple, order. A state of pan-European order, wherein cooperative and constructive partnerships are requisite amongst the vested great powers, with Russia as one of its lawful sentinels.” (Nasif 1) [see my LinkedIn article, “It Is Now Bound to a Single Act of Faith: Overcoming the 1999 Kosovo and the 2014 Ukraine Syndromes”]
Side by Side, Russian, European, and American soldiers—in addition to several other nationalities—had bled and died with valor in the Second World War (or, the Great Patriotic War) in order to preserve the light of the human soul. To those fallen heroes (martyrs of freedom and God’s children, for they brought peace upon earth) we owe our very lives. We further owe it to them to uphold and preserve the peace, which was won by their blood. This is an incontrovertible and perdurable truth.
The same could be said with respect to the unparalleled contribution of the Red Army to the Allies victory, so much so that:
“By general accounts, the Red Army suffered fifty-five times more casualties than did American forces, and inflicted ninety-three percent of German combat losses between the German invasion of Russia and the Allied invasion of France on D-Day. Counting operations in all the war theaters, the Soviet share of the total Allied effort according to Soviet estimates was about seventy-five percent.” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 21)
Why to trouble the reader with these statistics and reiterate common knowledge for the politically and historically savvy individual and the layperson alike?
That is in order to set-up the logical foundation for the following assumption:
Should any non-continental power mount an assault on Europe as a continent—which is highly unlikely a possibility; yet, it is pivotal for the argument’s line of reasoning—and a survey is to circulate across Europe with the inquiry of participants’ anticipation of probable Russian reaction to such aggression, listing three probabilities:
- Russia would join forces with the aggressor and mobilize its military to overrun Europe;
- Russia would adopt a policy of non-alignment, and opt not to side with any of the belligerent parties;
- Russia would come to Europe’s aid—regardless of the costs involved—and, notwithstanding international alliances and treaties.
The wager is, the third probability would receive the highest percentage of votes. Within the European subconscious, there lies the irrefutable recognition of the fact that any dispute with Russia is a continental affair; which in turn implies that Russia, despite its nonconformity to Europe’s political standards and values [emphasis added], is first and foremost an integral part of the European whole. And, true, the part may be at conflict with other parts and vie for dominance; still, it can never wish for a calamity to befall the whole—much less the whole’s utter destruction—lest it suffers from the same itself.
One is also tempted to wonder: Couldn’t President Putin’s connotative title, “Being Open, Despite the Past,” be applied to the US-UK special relationship as well?
None, in their right mind, despite the past—i.e. the war for the United States independence—, would contemplate that the United States shall ever fail to answer Great Britain’s call to join arms, without sounding entirely foolish to one’s self.
No one is endowed with the prerogative to choose their parents nor siblings, and neither their extended family members, for that matter; amongst whom the presence of a persona non grata constitutes a virtual certainty. The same familial fait accompli applies to certain nations and countries.
Granted, Russia “is an Eurasian country—its land mass stretches over both Asia and Europe with a ratio of 2:1, respectively—of a European culture yet undetermined European identity (Stent, 2014),” (Nasif 1).
Nonetheless, as has been deduced before herein, Russia’s overarching telos emanates from and revolves around Europe. For, ‘like it or not, deny it who will,’ this was wrought by He who fashioned the heavens and earth.
“… What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder,” (Matthew 19:6, KJV).
That is to say, Russia cannot be geographically severed off Europe. The actualization of an authentic and interminable pan-European whole requires as sine qua non the Russian component.
The Western-Russian contention mainly prevails then over Russia’s model of democracy—i.e. sovereign democracy. For those who don’t know, “Sovereign democracy is a “form of political life where the political powers, their authorities and decisions are decided and controlled by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom and fairness by all citizens, social groups and nationalities and by the people that formed it [my italics],” (Stent 142). Ostensibly, it is far from palatable for Western democratic taste—given Western perception thereof being an autocracy in disguise.
But, isn’t it self-evident that democracy is multiform, contrary to being uniform; and, that multiformity persists among allied democracies; still, in being so, assumes its evolution by means of acquiring the most useful applications derived from the multitude of forms. Does not American democracy vary from European democracies, much more so vis-á-vis Turkish democracy?
As a matter of fact, Turkish democracy has more features in common with Russian democracy, than the ones it shares with its European and American allies. Democracy, therefore, is country-specific-peculiarity rather than a universally-standardized model.
The bottom line is, what if the incorporation of Russia into a pan-European structure is the prerequisite apprenticeship for Russian democracy’s transformation? The reasoning applied to this scenario follows Pascal’s Wager: there is practically much to gain and too little, if anything at all, to lose from the establishment of such a structure.
Hasn’t the time come? Couldn’t this be the bedrock and much needed stimulus for a perpetual European, if not global, peace?
Fruit for thought…
Reference
Article by Vladimir Putin “Being Open, Despite the Past. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65899
Fitzgerald, Michael R., and Allen Packwood, Out of the Cold: the Cold War and its Legacy. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2013.
“GDP European Countries.” Statista, 1 June 2021, www.statista.com/statistics/685925/gdp-of-european-countries/. Accessed 25 June 2021.
Nasif, Alan. It Is Now Bound to a Single Act of Faith: Overcoming the 1999 Kosovo and the 2014 Ukraine Syndromes. LinkedIn Articles. 10 October 2020. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/alan-nasif-5a27687a_overcoming-the-1999-kosovo-and-the-2014-ukraine-activity-6720641763691810816-4QVg/
Silver, Caleb. “The Top 25 Economies in the World.” Investopedia, 24 Dec. 2020, www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/. Accessed 25 June 2021.
Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
The United States and Germany: Strengthening Our Alliance. US Department of State, 22 June 2021, www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-germany-strengthening-our-alliance/.
