A Lesson to Learn from JFK

It is beyond any doubt that the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was JFK’s greatest success vis-á-vis the Soviet Union. Thirteen days of unparalleled magnitude and vexation that was. A crisis that had the potential to undo human civilization as we know it! 

 

For the truth was, “World War Three would be fought with atomic weapons and the next war with sticks and stones,” (Kennedy 97). The same truth holds today. And, it all hangs upon a mere miscalculation. The numbers were appalling:

“While prospective U.S. casualties were not included in the estimate, the so-called Single Integrated Operational Plan posited a total of 285 million dead among the Russian, Chinese, and East European Victims [my formatting].” (Herken 274)

Though death tolls estimates for both World Wars remain debatable (a variance of few millions, that is), 285 million still exceeds the doubled aggregate sum of the worst estimates for WWI and WWII. 

This figure corresponds to the year 1962, imagine the multiples of which should we factor-in the applied technological advancement to both superpowers’ capabilities hence. The mere notion is horrid and appalling to the contemplator.

‘Pride and face’—President Kennedy reiterated—alongside ‘miscalculation’ during his Ex Comm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council) meetings (Kennedy, 1999). These two words, ‘pride and face’, he understood, ought neither be entertained within oneself, nor excited in the other party. 

As such, when action had to be taken, President Kennedy opted for “a naval “quarantine” of the island—a term of art chosen, in part, because a blockade was considered an act of war under international law,” (Herken 272).

Accordingly, Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson—the Russian expert  and ambassador at large—emphasized that President Kennedy had to “make it as easy as possible for [Khrushchev] to back down,” (Herken 273). 

President Kennedy’s old and entrusted friend David Ormsby-Gore—then Ambassador of Great Britain to the United States—supported Thompson’s advice and further counseled JFK,

“that the Soviets should be allowed more time in order to appraise the situation prudently (Kennedy, 1999),” (Nasif 117–118). “The President called McNamara and shortened it [the quarantine] to five hundred miles,” (Kennedy 52).

U.S.-Russian relations are not currently subject to a heightened nuclear crisis similar to that of October 1962. They remain contentious, nonetheless, to say the least. 

Having that said, what lesson could President Biden extrapolate thence?

In a word, diction! 

Russian leadership has demonstrated over time an explicit literalism in processing communications from the Western side in general, and the United States in particular. This is by no means a ‘Putin’s Russia peculiarity’. It has been the case for decades.

Therefore, President Biden’s aim should be: eschewing any sort of communication that could be literally interpreted by the Russians as a provocation of ‘pride’ or a call to save ‘face’. [Something which he could have done in his exclusive interview with ABC News, see “Presidents Biden and Putin ‘Understand One Another'”]

The truth of the matter is this:

Every President of the United States must incorporate that trait pertaining to the Russian character elementally [with emphasis] into the process of formulating his Russia policy as well as into his dealings with the Russian side.

As the saying goes, they ought to ‘say what they mean, and mean what they say’, literally!

Reference

Herken, Gregg. The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington. Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. London & New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.

Nasif, Alan. U.S.-Russian Exceptionalism: Intelligence, MAD, and Détente. Apple Books, 2019.