An Excerpt From My Magisterial Thesis: “U.S.-Russian Exceptionalism: Intelligence, MAD, and Détente”

Conceptualization: the Quasi-inherent ‘Supra-international Balance of Power’ of MAD

Post-Mutually-Assured-Destruction (MAD), it was no longer a question of tactic or strategy that molded the Balance of Power politics in U.S.-Russian relations. It became merely an inherent facet of U.S.-Russian relations, which was coined as such during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, and has been quasi-inherent ever since. Nor was it a question of balancing terror. For a rightful observation had once stated, “The truth of the matter is you only need five percent of your nuclear weapons to terrify the other side. You need ninety-five percent of them to reassure your own.” (Fitzgerald & Packwood 41)

Before proceeding to the role of intelligence in the MAD age, further elaboration on the quasi-inherent nature of MAD is requisite in order to clarify any remnant ambiguity. Since the days of old, no dyad of two super or preponderant powers entertained the possibility of a Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). An empire could have vanquished and extinguished another; a city could have done the same; or, in simple terms, an entity could have done this to another. For the sake of explaining MAD in a numerical sense, suppose one is constructing a game theory model of a ‘Normal Form’ and ending with identifiable Nash Equilibrium/(a).

The payoffs (i.e. utilities), at any given point, would be: first, ‘balanced’; and second, ‘calculable’ with precision. Any game concerning a single issue of policy has four possible outcomes. For example, if countries A and B are state actors considering a tariffs policy, where T denotes the imposition of tariffs on merchandize imported from the other country and ~T denotes the refrainment from imposing tariffs, then the four possible outcomes would be: TT, ~T~T, T~T, and ~TT.

The utility function for country A: U_A= X_A + Y_A

Possible Values: X_A (0,100) and Y_A(0,100)

The game has four possible outcomes: TT, T~T, ~TT, and ~T~T

Imposing tariffs  15-point gain on imported goods (X), 20-point loss on volume of trade between the two countries (Y) [status quo trade volume = 120]

The utility function for country B: U_B= X_B + Y_B

Possible Values: X_B (0,100) and Y_B(0,100)

The game has four possible outcomes: TT, T~T, ~TT, and ~T~T

Imposing tariffs  15-point gain on imported goods (X), 20-point loss on volume of trade between the two countries (Y) [status quo trade volume = 120]

TT  X_A = X_B = 115, Y_A = Y_B = 80

T~T  X_A= 115, X_B= 100, Y_A= Y_B = 80

~TT  X_A = 100, X_B = 115, Y_A = Y_B = 80

~T~T  X_A= X_B = 100, Y_A = Y_B = 120

The graphical representation of these combinations of outcomes and payoffs in Normal Form:

		A
		T	~T
B	T	X+Y= 195 X+Y= 195	X+Y= 180 X+Y= 195
B	~T	X+Y= 195 X+Y= 180	X+Y= 220 X+Y= 220

As apparent herein, every combination of outcomes and payoffs could be calculated numerically with exactitude. Whence, if the game evolves around a nuclear war scenario wherein the authority of ‘MAD’ subjugates the acting states, the theoretical payoff would be known—i.e. Mutually Assured Destruction—but cannot be computed numerically with precision. Given that MAD constrains only the United States and Russia, they will be the same acting countries in the exemplary application that would follow. Let A denote the United States of America and R denote Russia. Suppose the actors are considering the outcomes and payoffs of nuclear warfare, where N denotes nuclear attack and ~N denotes no attack; V for successful attack, G for global presence gained, and IR for irrational reservation. The four possible outcomes would be: NN, N~N, ~NN, and ~N~N.

The utility function for A: U_A= V_A + G_A + IR_A

The utility function for A under MAD: U_A= P_(MAD) *(i!-∞)

Possible Values: V_A (0,100), G_A(0,100), IR_A (0,100),

The game has four possible outcomes: NN, N~N where the non-attacker is irrational actor, ~NN where the non-attacker is irrational actor, and ~N~N

Carrying out a nuclear attack  25-point gain for successful attack, 80-point gain on global presence, and 30-point gain for the irrationality of the other side not to respond [status quo détente = 50-point gain on global presence]

The utility function for R: U_R= V_R + G_R + IR_R

The utility function for R under MAD: U_R= P_(MAD) * (x-∞)

Possible Values: V_R (0,100), G_R(0,100), and IR_R (0,100)

The game has four possible outcomes: NN, N~N, ~NN, and ~N~N

Carrying out a nuclear attack  25-point gain for successful attack, 80-point gain on global presence and the same is a loss for the other side if abstains from response, and 30-point gain for the irrationality of the other side not to respond [status quo détente = 50-point gain on global presence]

NN  U_A = U_R = P_(MAD) * (x-∞) [note: where the probability of MAD is 100%]

N~N  V_A = 125, V_R = 100, G_A= 180, G_R= 20, IR_A = 130, IR_R = 100

~NN  V_A = 100, V_R = 125, G_A= 20, G_R= 180, IR_A = 100, IR_R = 130

~N~N  V_A = V_R = 100, G_A = G_R = 150, IR_A= IR_R = 0

The graphical representation of these combinations of outcomes and payoffs in Normal Form:

	A
		N	~N
R	N	x-∞ x-∞	V+G+IR= 220 V+G+IR= 435
R	~N	V+G+IR= 435 V+G+IR= 220	V+G+IR= 250 V+G+IR= 250

In fine, the utility function for the United States and Russia would be 100% probability of mutually assured destruction per se because the term ‘assured’ is herein employed; multiplied by a variable x, which could be any number if nuclear destruction does not reach annihilation; minus negative infinity—denoting the plausible magnitude of utter desolation which would be brought forth with such undertaking (NN). The DOD reported contingency estimates to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 projecting the annihilation of millions of Americans, during the very few minutes of thermonuclear attack by the Soviets (Kennedy, 1999).

These estimates exemplify the quantitative reasoning behind not ascribing a definitive numerical value to x, but devising it to indicate that the magnitude of the destruction spreads across a spectrum. What defines ‘few minutes’ therein? Did it connote a segment of time between five and ten minutes; or, less than five minutes, perhaps? And, How many seconds read next to the minutes, exactly? What about the casualties resulting from the attack beyond these ‘first few minutes?’ And, what would have been the deaths toll per state? But, most importantly, How long should a nuclear warfare last before ‘MAD’ is rendered definitive an eventuality?

Unfortunately, none can profess the ability to answer these questions with considerable degree of certainty. Even a major surprise attack could not then completely destroy, with any significant confidence level, Soviet retaliatory capacity (Kennedy, 1999). The one indisputable certainty was, ‘whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation would run grave risks of general war’ (see Appendix IV).

The only black swan in this context would be that either the United States or Russia directly attack one another for some unfathomable reason, even beyond pride or face; otherwise, these two states can never get embroiled in a general war for the sake of a third party—in which case credit must be given to intelligence.

Read the full version on Apple Books: “U.S.-Russian Exceptionalism: Intelligence, MAD, and Détente”