Limitations to Contemporary Multilateralism: I. Introduction

Multilateralism, both in theory and principle, is all very fine and beneficial for all state actors in the international political system. Simply put, it is in the best universal collective interest. Notwithstanding, conventional wisdom compels us to always investigate both sides of the coin: prospective rewards as well as possible limitations. Given that its potential fruits and inherent virtues have been extensively extolled in recent months—courtesy of, chiefly, prominent Russian politicians, IR experts, and forefront political thinkers—, possible limitations pertaining thereto remain contemporarily unattended and must need be examined. In this, first of a series, article, the most salient limitations to multilateralism shall be identified.  

The idea of multilateralism, whether implicitly or explicitly, has been recently promulgated and bolstered by means of capitalization on an extant international interdependency; which in turn calls for cooperation betwixt mutually dependent (economically, politically, militarily, and, one may add, on a security level) states in an anarchic, yet interwoven by virtue of globalization, international system. That is to say, this contemporary notion [emphasis added] of multilateralism is deeply rooted in, and draws its rationale from, the premise of interdependence. Ideally, its proponents maintain that, if manifested, it shall be the substratum for the best possible version of states inter-and-co-action to transpire within the context of global governance in the international political realm.  

The truth of the matter is this:

The very conceptual relation vis-á-vis global interdependence is the theoretical ground whence the limitations to multilateralism emanate. For neither are the units (states) comprising the international system (which is ultimately a self-help system), individually, equally dependent; nor are they an agglomeration of equals (Waltz, 1979). More importantly still, and this leads to the natural deduction that, neither do they all have commensurate global presence—not even those recognized as great powers amongst them—; nor do they share equal stakes in global affairs and occurrences; and, needless to say, their capabilities remain vastly disproportionate—that, in rerum natura, constitutes a colossal limitation.

Moreover, this call for multilateralism has also been advanced on the basis of bipolarity’s obsolescence and the ‘professed’ shift towards a multipolar system—which is, to some extent, an imprecise representation of the international configuration. The case could far more convincingly be made in favor of a multipolarity that does not exceed a triad i.e. representative of the three superpowers’ {the United States, Russia, and China} preponderance on the international stage. Any addition to this triad would de facto impose another limitation on multilateralism’s sought ends [emphasis added]. 

Advocates of multipolarity, and incidentally multilateralism, assert that, 

“The ability or inability of states to solve problems is said to raise or lower their rankings [in the international power hierarchy, that is]. The relations of states may be examined instead of their capabilities, and since the former are always multilateral, the world is said to be multipolar.” (Waltz 129, 130) 

This conjuncture of the above-mentioned assertions, upon adequate rumination, yields an irremediable dichotomy, absurdly presented in a consequential manner. 

In subsequent supplementary releases to this series, each of those limitations would be investigated more in-depth, individually. 

Reference

Kenneth, Waltz N. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 2010.