There is an international cohort made of politicians, political scientists, and analysts, as well as students of international politics that holds the conviction that the superpower status, on the basis of capabilities, is altogether outdated; and, that the United States’ and Russia’s lead in which has been rapidly petering out over the course of the last decade; as other great and regional powers’ capabilities have considerably developed. They proceed to validate their conviction and its underlying theory by enumerating economic and technological advancements in carefully selected domains, more so in a cherry-picked manner, as well as geopolitical developments. In conducting themselves accordingly, they have taken off their scientific cloak—consequently, suspending their philosophical reasoning and soundness—whilst putting on that of the rhetorician.
Though applied in the treatment of pure ethics in the discernment of the general principles of the metaphysics of morals, the observation made by that renowned philosopher of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, bears tremendous explanatory power vis-á-vis this practice of theorizing:
“Now, if in giving a variety of proof for one and the same theorem, we flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very unphilosophical resource, since it betray trickery and dishonesty; for several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not produce certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason and consequence in a series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former is the usual device of the rhetorician.” (Kant 80, 81)
For the truth of the matter is this:
Granted, multilateralism is indispensable for addressing collective goods problems. Notwithstanding, collective goods problems are one aspect of global affairs; whilst, international occurrences and matters are another. That is purely due to vastly discrepant capabilities betwixt the great and super powers of the world. The causality which binds capabilities and interests runs a circular course. Not much of a surprise, it is no different than the question as to which was first: the hen or the egg. Certain interests impel states to develop particular capabilities; similarly, certain capabilities give rise to peculiar interests for states to pursue.
The discourse on capabilities has, unwittingly, for long turned a blind eye on secondary capabilities—those derived from primary ones. For instance, global presence could be classified as secondary capability derived from primary political, military, or economic capabilities, or from any combination of these. Global presence is a capability employed to exert global influence. A presence of such expanse inherently entails a wide range of obligations, responsibilities, and even vulnerabilities, beyond those normally pertaining to regional and other great powers.
For illustration purposes, let’s name India to be our globally-rising power of choice.
To put it in perspective, in considering peace in the Middle-East, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a conditio sine qua non towards the manifestation of durable and sustainable peace in the region. Now, it is absolutely ludicrous to entertain the thought that India could have ever had the interest or inclination; nor the obligation; the clout; much less hard and soft capabilities; and certainly not the exposure where its regional interests and assets are compromised, as the United States. Were India to engage in a case-specific multilateral action like this, its role would be of a subordinative nature—one undertaken in the form of ineffective diplomatic cordiality and political courtesy; simply because there are no immediate consequences for India produced from that affair. That is to say, India is, in pragmatic and practical terms, disinterested with respect to that protracted conflict.
The same applies to the Syrian civil war. What reason would call for India’s direct involvement—whether politically or militarily—in Syria? None whatsoever! Contrariwise, Russia has a naval base in the Syrian city of Tartus, and strategic geopolitical partnership with the Syrian regime in line with its balance-of-power strategy vis-á-vis the United States in that region, i.e. presence and influence. The balance-of-power game in the age of superpowers oscillates in scope along the spectrum between bilateral to selective-multilateral.
It is also imperative to add that neither India, nor any great or rising power for that matter, has the capability to act on such a global scale ‘propio motu et propiies auspicies’ (by [its] own power and on [its] own responsibility) [emphasis added]. Some would be so enthused to stand to correct me on this, saying: “This is why we advocate multilateral action regardless of individual capabilities.”
That is all very fine. But, what about their individual interestedness in the matter at hand; given the fact that interest is the first cause for action, much so for productive action. For as the oldest maxim of philosophy reads and denotes, ‘ex nihilo nihil’ (nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause). That is not to condemn other powers for lacking interest; yet, merely to state that such interest cannot be manifested out of nothing; which makes it needless to reiterate that they lack the outreach to exert notable influence.
In a nutshell, universal multilateralism is only operable in regard of universal collective goods problems, such as: climate change. In regard to other global affairs, of inferior magnitude, universal multilateralism is altogether inoperable for the want of interest and ability (embodied in applicable capabilities—namely, global presence) in absolute terms; lets it is doomed to fail right from its onset. Some matters remain particular to the superpowers, considering their global capabilities, wherein selective-multilateralism could actually be constructive.
Reference
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. Apple Books; trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott; prepared by Matthew Stapleton. 1780.
