As a species, we are innately predisposed towards improvement, growth, and evolution. For better or worse, that is. It is not implied per se, however, that such predisposition is universally and immutably oriented in the direction of the good. A criminal would still seek the improvement of their administration of their respective crime. Notwithstanding, the matter of interest to be attended herein is reformation i.e. the pursuit of betterment and development pertaining to the morally sought conditions of mankind.
Man seeks reforms, yet finds himself at interminable war with their proponents and protagonists. This stark paradox could be rightly attributed to the deterioration of the human judgment faculties. The development of the human reason is farthest from being consistent, much less progressive. Over time, our reason has been constantly the subject of abrupt ebbs and flows. One era would witness a notable transcendence of reason; while another would be marked with reason’s hideous plummeting towards the abyss.
The overarching cause thereof remains unclear to me at present, given that many factors distinctively contribute to the peculiar manifestation of each incident. The multitude and diversity of underlying factors greatly inhibit the arrival at such determination with adequate levels of certainty. Nevertheless, one condition appears to prevail through time and maintain its clout in spite of fluctuations in the state of reason: the preponderant power of suggestibility over the psychology of the crowd.
A technical explication of the term is herein requisite, starting with the base-root i.e. suggestion:
“The word suggestion has become rather colourless in popular language, but for the psychologist, it has a very definite meaning. Suggestion is always a proposition for action, which is forced on the mind in such a way that the impulse to opposite action becomes inhibited [my formatting].” (Hugo Münsterberg 345)
Simply put, in psychological terms, suggestion is a determinant guiding impetus for the mind’s inclination towards action.
It is crucially important to note that the power of suggestion is exponentially amplified among human agglomerations as compared to its influence over an individual mind on its own—given that the collective intellect of the crowd is pitiably inferior vis-á-vis that of an isolated individual; which both Hugo Münsterberg (1914) and Gustave Le Bon (1841) provided comprehensive and intellectually satisfactory proofs corroborating such deduction in “Psychology and Social Sanity,” and, “The Crowd; a Study of the Popular Mind,” respectively.
Think of those believers in far-fetched, Hollywood material, conspiracy theories. For instance, that wild theory of shape-shifting alien reptiles holding the highest public offices worldwide: an unabashed insult to human reason and intelligence at par. Nevertheless, it found a host in the popular mind of a particular crowd.
Question: How does the inferior popular mind overpower the superior mind of the individual in determining the latter’s actions?
Inter alia, yet above all else, ab effectu of the concoction of amnesty and security:
“…the individual forming part of a crowd acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to yield to instincts which, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint. He will be the less disposed to check himself from the consideration that, a crowd being anonymous, and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely.” (Le Bon 44) [Italics and bold fonts are mine]
Thence, the natural byproduct thereof would be an inner sense of uncontested omnipotence. And, who wouldn’t trade their intellect, superior or not, along everything of value in their possession for that, right? Alas! This comes at a grave cost: “For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” (Mark 8:36, KJV)
It holds equally true to say, “For what good is it for a man, if he shall gain and harness all mundane powers, yet lose his reason?”
Münsterberg made an excellent observation:
“The more persons work together, the less, they say, every single man can reach his highest level. They become a mass with mass consciousness, a kind of crowd in which each one becomes oversuggestible. Each one thinks less reliably, less intelligently, and less impartially than he would by himself alone [my formatting]. We know how men in a crowd do indeed lose some of the best features of their individuality. A crowd may be thrown into a panic, may rush into any foolish, violent action, may lynch and plunder, or a crowd may be stirred to a pitch of enthusiasm, may be roused to heroic deeds or to wonderful generosity, but whether the outcome be wretched or splendid, in any case it is the product of persons who have been entirely changed. In the midst of the panic or in the midst of the heroic enthusiasm no one has kept his own characteristic mental features. The individual no longer judges for himself; he is carried away, his own heart reverberates with the feelings of the whole crowd. The mass consciousness is not an adding up, a mere summation, of the individual minds, but the creation of something entirely new. Such a crowd may be pushed into any paths, chance leaders may use or misuse its increased suggestibility for any ends [my italics]. No one can foresee whether this heaping up of men will bring good or bad results.” (Münsterberg 251, 252)
That being said, it necessarily follows that the attainment of this uncontested omnipotence depends entirely on one’s station with respect to the order of the crowd. Inasmuch as it could be real and true for the leader, it is farthest from being either for any amongst the number comprising the crowd. In fact, it is only the leading figure or clique that reap any fruits—which the actions of a crowd may yield—amidst the cheers and hails of the ‘horde’. Consider the case of Donald Trump, QAnon, and the January 6 insurrection; and, how Trump raised funds to ‘allegedly’ overturn the results of the presidential elections. Image captured? Good! The same hypnotism—the highest degree of suggestibility (Münsterberg, 1914)—has been omnipresent across dictatorships throughout human history.
Make no mistake! For notwithstanding all the virtuousness that may be inherent in the individual’s intent, more so in the crowd’s, this is where every spirit for reformation meets its end!
For the truth of the matter is this:
In the beginning, man contemplates grand reformational ideas; subsequently promulgates them among the masses, naïvely thinking that in the popular mind lies the security of their manifestation; hence, counterintuitively attempts to subjugate the individual mind to the former; and, ultimately, finds himself setting in motion the counter forces for the very reforms he so solemnly sought to bring about.
In Athens, during the era in which Socrates lived, philosophy was the vehicle and reason was the grandest of all prizes. Nonetheless, Athenians, acting as a crowd (even worse, a democratic crowd), though enamored with philosophy and reason, succumbed to the power of over-suggestibility. Few imbeciles managed to lure the crowd into believing that Socrates was corrupting the youth and blaspheming against the gods of the city, which was utterly an antithesis for what Socrates was actually doing. All of this was accomplished via nonsensical reference to Aristophanes’ (424 BC) comedy play, “The Clouds”.
Eventually, the crowd sentenced the foremost protagonist of philosophy and reason, the father of moral philosophy, to death.
Hence, the conclusion, man seeks reformation, yet wages war against its proponents and bearers on every front.
Reference
Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd; A Study of the Popular Mind. Apple Books; Scanned with OmniPage Professional OCR software donated by Caere, Originally published 1841.
Münsterberg, Hugo. Psychology and Social Sanity. Apple Books; New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1914.
