Post-Soviet Russian-Western Relations [Part I: Glasnost and Perestroika]

An in-depth scrutiny of the last two decades of the twentieth century is key to fathom contemporary Russian-Western relations. Twenty eventful years were the 1980s and 1990s; as they entailed heightened rivalry, rapprochement, and teetering partnership. Of a plethora of significant phenomena that manifested during that period, three affairs have had remarkably outweighed all others in molding and defining Russia’s relations to the rest of Europe and the United States today: Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, the unification (or, reunification) of Germany, and the integration of post-Soviet Russia in international structures. What is the common denominator, you may ask? It is, in a word, disappointment. Since the unification of Germany and the integration of post-Soviet Russia in international structures will each be discussed separately in subsequent articles, Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika will be the focal point herein.

In order to understand why domestic policies, such as glasnost and perestroika, would have such a huge, and incidentally detrimental, impact on post-Soviet Russian relations to the West and would eventually fuel Russian disappointment, a brief account of the context and internal Soviet reality in which they were manifested and adopted must be provided.

To the West, Gorbachev represented a long-awaited generational change in Soviet leadership; to his Soviet comrades, he was an eccentric figure. After a succession crisis in the early 1980s due to ‘fossilization,’ Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as the Secretary General of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). By the time he ascended to power, the Soviet Union had already exhausted its economy and drastically depleted its resources in a Herculean—and, economically speaking, unwinnable—arms race with the United States. As a matter of fact, he had inherited a completely dysfunctional economic system.

 

By the admission of Alexander Likhotal, Gorbachev’s then spokesperson and senior advisor, the Soviet economic apparatus was not moribund but dead: “It has been said that the Soviet economic system did not function well by the 1980s, when Gorbachev rose to power after Andropov’s death. I would say this is an underestimation. The Soviet economic system did not function at all [my formatting].” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 74)

 

 

Notwithstanding the increasingly onerous nature of his rescue mission, due to fierce opposition from elements inside the CPSU, which had intensified even more as he so passionately promulgated his policies of glasnost (openness in political discussion) and perestroika (economic reform), Gorbachev pressed on. But, for what? 

Wasn’t it all too obvious that the Communist Party would be intolerant of reforms? For, what is a reform? As Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton, First Earl of Lytton, had distinguished it from revolution, “A reform is a correction of abuses,” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 68). And how would abuses be corrected? First, they are recognized. Second, their perpetrators are identified. Third, as in the natural course of events, abuses are reversed (corrected) by means of holding those who committed them accountable. 

In the case of the Soviet Union, in a system where all aspects of public and private life were controlled by the ruling party, ipso facto making the latter responsible for all outcomes, Gorbachev needed to harness domestic power from without the Communist Party to make the necessary ‘corrections’ for perestroika (economic reform) to work properly. Given the Communist Party’s monopoly on governmental powers, he was left with no alternative source of power other than the masses. Hence, in 1986, he introduced and adopted a policy of openness in political discussion (glasnost) to rally the public. 

 

I am inclined to assume this wasn’t much of a surprise to no one, for Gorbachev had explicitly stated his intent to bring a wave of political change as early as March 1985, namely vis-á-vis Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. He then made it clear that he would dramatically reduce Moscow’s commitment to the Eastern-European satellites—in a way, offloading some dispensable political and, foremost, military burdens for Russia. “During the days surrounding Chernenko’s funeral, Gorbachev met with the leaders of every communist party in Eastern Europe. During these conversations, he told every one of them, “You are responsible for your own country. Do not expect us to get involved.” Nobody believed him at that time,” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 69).

 And, how could they believe him? After all, that was a radically paradoxical démarche to the conventional Soviet modus operandi, to say the least; one that would undo the Brezhnev Doctrine. But, “[Gorbachev] believed that a country could not be free if it enslaved other nations,” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 69). Which country was Likhotal referring to in this statement? It was surely Russia.

 

In essence, Gorbachev was applying liberal principles to a bureaucratic and terribly centralized system. Furthermore, it was stark obvious that he was concerned with “Russia first,” rather than the entire Union. And, that in itself is quite telling. He was in a way westernizing Russia [emphasis added]—albeit how incomprehensible it may sound to claim that a “diehard Bolshevik,” as President Reagan would describe him on the heels of their Geneva Conference in 1985, would even entertain such notion, much less undertake the endeavor, by any stretch of the imagination.

Which brings us back to the question: wherefore did Gorbachev press on with glasnost and perestroika? It is very plausible that, in his heart, he sought to save the USSR. Nevertheless, he was caught in an inescapable reality; that the Soviet economic model proved ineffective in the long-run; that the continuation of the same model would indubitably exacerbate existing problems; and, eventually, the Union would inevitably implode—inflicting incalculable damage on Russia. 

 

My wager is that he might have reckoned that, if there was the slightest possibility for him to save anything, it was a conditio sine qua non that Russia be saved first. Towards that end, he knew that the new model had to have a socialist touch to reassure his conservatives, whilst simultaneously possessing the requisite ingredients to emulate Western success. In this regard, the West had utterly misunderstood Gorbachev. They had mistakingly taken his official rhetoric at face value.

Sir Roderic Lyne, Former British Ambassador to Russia, recalls from his time at Chatham House as a research fellow, “We were studying what Gorbachev was doing and how we were handling him. And in a way, our initial analysis of Gorbachev was not wrong. We originally thought that this man, as a communist sitting on the top of the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal, was still dangerous and threatening to us. What he was trying to do was to make the communist system work better and become more effective. Therefore, from our perspective, this made him more threatening in the competition between East and West [my italics].” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 60)

 

Though I now speak from the vantage point of reflection on the past, it is, as well as it was back at the time (I would dare say), apparent that the British (Western) analysis of Gorbachev was conducted through—more so, fixated on—the prism of rivalry. As a result, they failed to detect the originality and Western-leaning nature of his pivot.

My own personal wild take on this is: that Gorbachev was cognizant—to the least extent, at subconscious level—that the USSR couldn’t be saved. And, if the union of republics was no more, Russia would have to stand on its own. Nevertheless, he might also have thought that a liberally (to some degree) reformed Russia (one that would “recognize the freedom of other nations to leave the Soviet Union,” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 69)) could theoretically be accepted or admitted into the Collective-West. By the same token, he was probably hoping then—and, if he truly had had the hopes I am about to mention, his capital and unpardonable mistake would have been that he kept them private; instead of actively seeking their manifestation—that he would receive British and American support to make perestroika work. To his misfortune, that support was pitiable at best; as they were too busy extracting concessions from him. 

 

Lord Powell of Bayswater had correctly observed, “One could argue that one of the problems with Russia today is that the West virtually raped Gorbachev in 1989 and 1990. He made all the concessions. He was forced to step back on everything: on Berlin, and on the democratization of Eastern Europe [here I would beg to differ, on the premise that Alexander Likhotal’s account of the exchanges between Gorbachev and leaders of communist parties in Eastern Europe surrounding Chernenko’s funeral is true and accurate, then Gorbachev allowed the democratization of Eastern Europe of his own volition]. In return from us he got very little, especially in terms of economic assistance [my formatting]. This left Gorbachev really to the mercy of the ultra-right extremist backlash, which was followed by his dethronement by Yeltsin. I know a lot of people would take the view it was not our job to keep Gorbachev in his position, and I agree with that. I think, however, that maybe Russia today would be run in a slightly different way if that whole process had been handled a little more gently, and a little more slowly [my formatting].” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 66)

 

In short, Gorbachev was left up a creek without a paddle. To be fair, nevertheless, Reagan and Thatcher might not have known that he was up that creek—of making Russia eligible for integration into the Collective-West. But that only adds the insult of disinterestedness to Gorbachev’s injury. “Little attention was paid to Gorbachev’s thinking at the time,” (Fitzgerald and Packwood 69) notes Likhotal. 

 

What is quite remarkable and worth shedding ALL the lights on, is the fact that this might have been, despite how subtle it was, Russia’s first search for its place in, the Collective-West by means of IMPLEMENTED reformational, political and economic, policies [much emphasis added here!]; which it (Russia), free from any external pressure, chose to adopt; and the geopolitical-West (mainly, the United States and Britain) had been totally oblivious to it!

 

It’s like a pirate letting a treasure drown while his eyes are set fixed on it.

 

Food for thought…

 

 

 

Reference

Fitzgerald, Michael R., and Allen Packwood, Out of the Cold: the Cold War and its Legacy. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2013.