Cutting straight to the chase, grievance is NEVER the cradle for violent radicalization; merely the call-to-action force, a trigger. To put it in perspective, the premise that violent radicalization primarily springs from grievance bears no more truth in it, than the inference that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo was the overarching cause for World War I. A sufficient casus belli, nonetheless; that, it surely was. But that should not obscure the fact that the entire European mise-en scène at the time had already situated the great powers, whether rationally or irrationally [recommended source: Christopher Clark’s (2012), “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914”], on the brink of war. As such, it was at most the first shot to be fired. That grievance is perhaps the most frequently repeated first outcry, the first shot fired, denoting the imminently subsequent outburst, radicalization, albeit a just cause, it yet falls far short from being the foremost one.
Redundancy demonstrably characterizes the plethora of academic and sociological literary works on radicalization, namely the violent type thereof. A great number of those scholars and social scientists approach(ed) the subject following the same erroneous sequential methodology, namely with respect to causality. They all too often tend to investigate the matter prejudiciously (i.e. with pronounced biases) and in hindsight. Their investigation as well as contemplation commence with the a-posteriori knowledge that grievance was present and radicalization had eventuated. Hence, the reversion process, in terms of both causality and temporality, does not reach the point of inception.
That being said, grievance is mistaken for the inception point; and, consequently, the expedition to solely explore the causes of grievance at grassroots level is set afoot. In other words, the exposition of violent radicalization, premeditatedly, transpires within the dimensional parameters of grievance. The roadmap is intentionally delineated so that all inputs {poverty, lack of opportunity, and lack of social mobility, exploitation, etc.} are set on a defined course leading thither grievance. Thus, an invariable ætiological correlation is established between grievance and violent radicalization.
Such a correlation remains susceptible to negation with relative ease, and requires nothing in excess of mild attentiveness. If the said correlation stands incontrovertible, then it would be logical to presume that violent radicalization must inevitably manifest wherever an acute condition of grievance is found—which is, evidently, not the case.
The question is therefore: What is the inception point, or first cause, of radicalization viz. violent radicalization?
The truth of the matter is this:
He who cultivates the land is fully aware that the quality of the harvest is infinitely dependent on the fertility of the soil. The distinction between those aggrieved who succumb to radicalization—or, more specifically, violent radicalization—and those who withstand the temptation is drawn from the differentiation vis-á-vis character in lieu of circumstance. Both classes are subjected to unbearable grievance; nevertheless, one yields to violent reaction and the other perseveres.
How come, some may wonder—as they correctly should!
[Note: I pray that the reader isn’t too hasty to judge, for it is not in my intention to anyhow suggest that one group is a set of predestined sinners and the other of predestined saints. My intent shall be stated momentarily.]
The answer lies in, and is incidentally one and the same with, our sought after inception point i.e. the fountainhead of violent radicalization.
In a word, upbringing. More precisely, the Paideía ‘παιδεία’ aspect thereof; and, here, I employ the term in its literally sense as an express command to ‘tame thyself’ within a defined moral sphere.
In absolute terms, the vast majority of humanity is living under challenging-to-harsh conditions, with an approximately 30% (the common approximation is usually 25%; that said, I had to pour in some of my optimism) minority enjoying a quality of life that spans the spectrum between decent and privileged i.e. having access to utilities, proper education, and healthcare, in addition to social security, as well as good chances for employment, potential for personal growth, etc. Now, the syllogism that destitute is a precondition for grievance; and the latter is gnawing in instances of violent radicalization; therefore, all aggrieved are violent radicals (or, prone to malicious radicalization); is a logical fallacy at best. Time and again, rich bankers defraud clients; clergymen of every religion and sect viciously exploit the layman; super-rich individuals evade taxes; and, saintlike figures overindulge in obscene vanities. Such examples are detectable to the naked eye—even more so apparent to the meanest intelligence—in every country and society all over the world. It is hence logically safe to infer that a person’s materialistic welfare (i.e. their quality of life) cannot be held as the best gauge for ethical conduct, much less morality.
For, be not led astray! It is ultimately a question of morality—true vs. pseudo sense of morality, that is.
All types of radicals, benevolent and malevolent alike, act toward a moral end. They differ, however, in their sense of morality. The great and chief end of radical action is change. How such and such change is brought about is entirely reliant on the proponents’ sense of morality.
To elucidate the matter more precisely, a true sense of morality bounds its holder to certain ideals and virtues. Credit must be given where it’s due: hitherto, Socratic morality stands as the universally rationally-uncontested authority on the subject—given that Socrates is the father of moral philosophy. Socrates had emphatically posed that temperance is the greatest virtue of all.
Accordingly, it is temperance that set the benevolent class of radicals on the path of intellectualism and social development and justice, rather than violence and terrorism. Their cause has more to do with what one should do as opposed to what one can do. Despite being aggrieved with, inter alia, social decadence, having access to violence does not translate into putting it to application via mobilizing the masses. That option is never on the table for those heroes of humanity.
Contrariwise, the absence of temperance intensifies sentimentalities whilst diminishing the authority of reason—and, in so doing, cultivates violent defiance that gnaws amongst malevolent radicals. Speaking of which, my memory seems stimulated to recollect the words of the celebrated Søren Kierkegaard from, “The Sickness Unto Death,” (originally published in 1849): those I deem most aptly descriptive vis-á-vis defiance, and equally hold as superior to my own in terms of diction and syntax; therefore, am inclined to recite them in verbatim.
“It usually originates as follows. A self that in despair wills to be itself is pained in some distress or other that does not allow itself to be taken away from or separated from his concrete self. So now he makes precisely this torment the object of all his passion, and finally it becomes a demonic rage. By now, even if God in heaven and all the angels offered to help him out of it—no, he does not want that, now it is too late. Once he would gladly have given everything to be rid of this agony, but he was kept waiting [my formatting: to pinpoint where temperance could have been a safety valve]; now it is too late, now he would rather rage against everything and be the wronged victim of the whole world and of all life [my formatting: to denote the inception of violent radicalism], and it is of particular significance to him to make sure that he has his torment on hand and that no one takes it away from him—for then he would not be able to demonstrate and prove to himself that he is right [my italics: to emphasize the influence of a pseudo sense of morality]. This eventually becomes such a fixation that for an extremely strange reason he is afraid of eternity, afraid that it will separate him from his, demonically understood, infinite superiority over other men, his justification, demonically understood, for being what he is. —Himself is what he wills to be. He began with the infinite abstraction of the self, and now he has finally become so concrete that it would be impossible to become eternal in that sense; nevertheless, he wills in despair to be himself. What demonic madness—the thought that most infuriates him is that eternity could get the notion to deprive him of his misery.” (Kierkegaard 72)
Temperance is fortunately not inherent but acquired. As such, a proper upbringing must needs be an upbuilding one; wherein temperance is vehemently inculcated into the psyche. Temperance averts all subjugation to extremities—except the absolute devotion for the love of wisdom i.e. philosophy. Since, true wisdom can only guide the individual toward intellectual, spiritual, and inadvertently moral transcendence (i.e. true sense of morality); those in turn germinate the seeds of benevolence and altruism—leading to peace—within the individual.
In a nutshell, crude upbringing is the fountainhead of violent radicalization—i.e. that which allows the possibility for the latter to emerge from the realm of potentiality into that of actuality—; as it is fundamentally wanting of genuinely moral upbuilding (founded upon the correct form of rearing, ‘taming oneself’, Paideía ‘παιδεία’); that may incite temperance: the ultimate safeguard against the temptations of violent radicalization. Therefore, to avert, or leastways hinder, future resurgences of violent radicalization, efforts must need be made to incorporate temperance in the rearing and upbringing of communities and populations susceptible to radicalization.
Reference
Kierkegaard, Søren. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening. Princeton UP, 1980.
