Laid out brilliantly, by Otto von Bismarck, within the context of ‘the proper use of principles in matters of diplomacy’ in regard of Prussia’s foreign policy—more purposively towards the disposal of which in such matters; for they ipso facto being principles, they bound statesmen to affection and antipathy; which eo ipso enforce impractical, even pernicious, prejudices on their judgments—; this deduction, “A policy of sentiment is dangerous, for it is one-sided,” (Headlam, 235) may quite aptly have an universal application with respect to social behavior and interactions. Bismarck, insightfully, proceeded to add,
““Every other Government makes its own interests the sole criterion of its actions, however much it may drape them in phrases about justice and sympathy.” “My ideal for foreign policy is freedom from prejudice; that our decisions should be independent of all impressions of dislike or affection for Foreign States and their governments [my italics: added for emphasis].”” (Headlam, 235)
Our emotive faculties naturally operate autonomously—that is, independent of our rational faculties. Contrary to the latter, which are incapable of self-development without practical cultivation; the former, left to follow their natural course, unbridled, they are propelled toward self-intensification. Should their self-intensification outpace the practical cultivation of reason, logic is destined for an inescapable subordination wherein it is helplessly overwhelmed by emotions.
Being emotional or sensitive does not mount for a crime against reason. These are inherent human characteristics. What makes them problematic is the quasi-implied common belief in their reciprocity. Just as is the case with foreign policy, as per Bismarck’s delineation, so it is with our daily social interactions: sentiments are peculiarities pertaining to each individual person; thus, one-sided. They never run a perfectly reciprocal course ( a 360º rotation that would inevitably make the start and finish points one and the same); which has two main aspects for our consideration: strict mutuality and intensity.
For illustration purposes, let us suppose that we have two individuals who are not particularly fond [emphasis added] of one another. Now, most people would be haste to presume that the two persons hate one another from the mere indication that fondness is lacking between them. This presumption constitutes a reasonable probability, but not an apodeictic certainty. Other probabilities may include: one hates the other, while the other seems to solely being unable to tolerate the first person; one dislikes the other, who happens to actually hate them; etc.
The expression ‘not particularly fond’ might suggest any of these three: intolerance, dislike, and hatred. And they, in spite of their connotative intersections, all stand distinct from one another. Intolerance means one’s inability to bear or cope with; dislike, though generally perceived as a subtle degree of hatred, as is like vis-á-vis love, yet it is distinct in that it doesn’t perforce incite neither an inclination to bid someone ill—much less one to do them harm—, it could be purely a mild disposition of repellence; and, hatred, “intense dislike or ill will [my formatting: added for emphasis],” (“Definition of HATRED”) [Note: the formatting added to the ‘definition of hatred’ for emphasis aims to underscore that which is implied per se therein, yet remains merely a possibility in lieu of an intrinsic actuality in the case of dislike, i.e. ill will].
To put sentimental intensity in perspective, in a more cheerful and uplifting manner, consider parental and filial love. The parent-child relationship is in rerum natura crowned with one of the highest forms of love. Indubitably mutual, it is immensely felt and expressed. The sentiments in this case are idem per idem (i.e. the same, or identical). Nonetheless, even immensity has a vast gradation. Many physiological and psychological factors contribute to the intensity of parent-child love: from gender to prior experience (in the case of parents, their former experience of this kind of love via their relationship with their own parents), etc. Therefore, though possible, commensurate [emphasis added] parental-filial love does not qualify for an apodeictic certainty.
That being said, the question is this: what is/are the implication(s) of ‘a policy of sentiment’ on our daily social behavior and interactions?
If someone has hatred towards another person; and, formulates his interaction with the latter on the basis of that sentiment; whilst, unbeknownst to the former—since it is obscured by their overly-sentimental peculiar predisposition—the other person entertains a neutral disposition towards the former, or a moderate intolerance—even a mild dislike; the first’s act of emitting hatred in the air of their relationship would intoxicate the mind of the second; inducing the second’s mind to think that reciprocal hatred is the only suitable recourse; hence, aggravating their intolerance or dislike to the extremity of hatred; reconciliation would thus no longer be psychologically tenable; ultimately, the two become entangled in an endless feud; and worse, due to intractable ill will, they become dedicated to bring down destruction upon one another. In short, the first person’s policy of sentiment vis-á-vis the second has earned him an enemy—that could have remained inconsequentially disliking them—or, passively intolerant—even aloof altogether, towards them; which they are relatively better off without. That is, as the old saying goes, “hate begets hate; and blood begets blood.”
In a nutshell, pragmatically speaking, pure rationality (namely, free from over-sentimental prejudice), taking into account one’s peculiar interests, should be the uncontested impetus for our social interactions, since “A policy of sentiment is dangerous, for it is one-sided [my formatting],” (Headlam, 235).
Reference
“DEFINITION OF HATRED.” American English Apple Dictionary. 2021. Accessed 9 August 2021.
Headlam, James Wycliffe. Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire. Apple Books; edited by Evelyn Abbott, M.A., 1899.
