Understanding Vladimir Putin: President Putin WON’T ‘Invade and Occupy’ Ukraine

WHILE A MILITARY SHOWDOWN, OR LIMITED ACTION OF SORTS, YET LOOMS AS A POSSIBILITY; an invasive occupation of Ukraine remains out of any Russian calculation; especially with President Vladimir Putin at the helm of Russian leadership. Not him. Neither provocation, nor vanity, could lure him to make such a grand error of judgment.  He’s simply too experienced to fall for such a capital mistake. For those who make use of the 2014 Annexation of Crimea to buttress their invasion theory, they have grossly failed to see the grand picture; to understand the mechanism of the man’s strategic compass; and comprehend that Crimea is one thing and the whole of Ukraine is another thing entirely. 

The wager is that Putin is sober enough to tell wine from poison—even if the latter is served in a golden cup. He’s unquestionably familiar with the proverb: Venenum in auro bibitur. 

 

For the truth of the matter is this:

 

No contemporary head of state fathoms the power of change more than he. Admittedly, Vladimir Putin is a conservative, but a ‘healthy conservative,’  nonetheless. Which he explained via the authority of one Nikolai Berdyayev, whom he deems one of Russia’s remarkable philosophers: “Conservatism is not something preventing upward, forward movement, but something preventing you from sliding back into chaos,” (“Valdai Discussion Club Meeting”). He grew up in a totalitarian environment where every aspect, even the smallest particular, of public and private life was controlled by the state; wherein it was considered an act of patriotism for family members to ‘inform on their loved ones’ (“Valdai Discussion Club Meeting”); yet, even such an iron fist could not prevent the wind of change. 

 He was there in Dresden in 1989, and had actually experienced the slipping of the GDR out of the Soviet grip firsthand (Stent, 2014). Even with a colossal intelligence apparatus, such as the KGB, and a remarkably apt operating arm thereof in the GDR, i.e. Stasi, once the political reality had changed, so did the behavior of the crowd. Whatever inner sentiment the crowd held within was unleashed in an instant. He reflected upon that personal experience in his autobiographical interview years later, “I only regretted that the Soviet Union had lost its position in Europe, although intellectually I understood that a position based on walls and dividers cannot last [my formatting]…” (Stent 51).

Putin is no amateur to reinstate a broken system, or order, predestined to collapse in foresight. He’s a seasoned statesman girded with astounding philosophical, political, and historical foundation. He fully understands that this is neither the sixteenth nor the nineteenth century [emphasis added]. Further, he comprehends that expansion must needs manifest in a spirit of accord betwixt the integrating populations; lest it becomes a fast track to disaster and disorder. If there’s a contemporary head of state in our days who has had genuinely learned the lessons history has to offer, it can be no other than Vladimir Putin. 

There’s not a shadow of doubt that seeing Russia and Ukraine as one country is one of Putin’s innermost desires. Notwithstanding, he’s a man of reason and is well aware that a unity forced by means of invasion cannot be sustainable; especially of countries by the size of Russia and Ukraine; and given the zeitgeist of our day. More so, it will most definitely sow seeds of contempt in the hearts of Ukrainians—pro and anti-Russia, alike. In short, Putin is sensible enough to dismiss the maxim, “the end justifies the means.” 

Furthermore, stability has continuously been Putin’s compass in navigating Russia toward her telos. It is ridiculously absurd to think that he should instill chaos into, even bring havoc upon, dare I say, the current state of Russia for the sake of some vain, short-lived, glory or personal ego. Not him. Not Vladimir Putin. And, certainly, not under his watch. He’s absolutely resolved that Russia should not endure another bezporiadok (referring to the 1990s, subsequent to the disintegration of the USSR). 

One might also add that such an imperial démarche would undo, in the blink of an eye, years of herculean efforts to put Russia on a path leading to some sort of integration into the European whole, via an economic corridor—i.e. the Nord Stream projects. [See the “Nord Stream: More Than a Pipeline,” series]

 

In a nutshell, Putin stands to gain nothing from invading Ukraine. Quite the contrary, really! He stands to incur hideous political, economic, and diplomatic cost—all for nothing. There’s no mathematical system to make the numbers add-up vis-á-vis possible advantages that this endeavor could yield. And, sure enough, whether you like the man or not, Putin is farthest from being an easily irritable, nonsensical megalomaniac. To put it simply, he’s one of very few grandmasters of statecraft and the balance of power game, in modern history.

 

 

 

Related Publications: “It Is Now Bound to a Single Act of Faith: Overcoming the 1999 Kosovo and the 2014 Ukraine Syndromes;” “Zelensky’s Ukraine: An Asset or a Liability for the United States?;” “Nord Stream 2: More Than a Pipeline;” “Nord Stream 2: More Than a Pipeline [Part II: Migrants Border Crisis and Russian Military Build-up on Ukraine’s Border];” “Nord Stream 2: More than a Pipeline [Part III: Not an Imperial Russian Enterprise].”

 

 

Reference

Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Valdai Discussion Club Meeting. 21 Oct. 2021, en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975. Accessed 31 Oct. 2021.